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Collusion and Financial Leverage:
An Analysis of the
Integrated Mill Steel Industry
Richard A. Lord and W. Ken Farr*
We show that firms can design their capital structure to provide a publicly observable
indication of compliance with a collusive agreement. We develop two empirically testable
hypotheses based on this argument and test these propositions on data for seven integrated
mill steelfirms. Our study period covers years when prices were overtly coordinated under
the basing point pricing system and after the demise of the system. Empirical tests confirm
the hypotheses that leverage is positively related to both price elasticity of demand and the
level of convertibles outstanding during the years after the collapse of the basing point
pricing system.

Since the Modigliani and Miller (1958) study, one of the central issues in financial economics

is why and how firms choose specific capital structures. Ravid (1988) reviews a number of
studies that focus on product market conditions and financial decisions, yet Harris and Raviv
(1991) indicate a serious lack of research relating financial leverage to the nature of the firm's
product market.
Maksimovic (1988) suggests that leverage can be used to effectively maintain collusion. First,

he defines the general conditions and motivations that make it possible and desirable for
oligopolists that have only equity in their capital structure to engage in collusion. He then
shows that when a firm is partially financed with nonconvertible debt, there is a discernable
ceiling on leverage that is a positive function of a firm's price elasticity of demand. This ceiling
provides a publicly observable gauge that the colluding firms can use to judge compliance with
a collusive agreement. The firms that do not exceed the threshold indicate their intention to
abide by the compact. Firms that exceed the ceiling send the opposite message, thus jeopardizing

the continuing existence of the cartel. Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) and Stenbacka (1994)
outline similar approaches to Maksimovic.
We extend Maksimovic's model to show that the use of convertible securities in place of
nonconvertible debt permits a firm to exceed the industry's debt ceiling and still demonstrate compliance

with the agreement. This is possible because the conversion options attached to the debt allow

bondholders to share in gains the stockholders would realize by deviating from the collusive
arrangement. The extent to which debt can be increased above the ceiling is a positive function of the
number of shares of common stock obtained after exchange of the convertible securities.

If we assume that firms use capital structure to indicate compliance with a collusive arrangement,

the theoretical arguments imply two empirically testable hypotheses. The first is that leverage
should vary positively in response to changes in the price elasticity of demand. The second is

that leverage should be a positive function of the number of new equity shares created if
bondholders were to exercise all their convertible security options.
We test both of these hypotheses using data that measure financial leverage, price elasticity
of demand, and convertible security usage for seven domestic integrated mill steel firms. Our
The authors wish to thank the Editors and an anonymous referee who provided valuable suggestions to improve the paper

*Richard A. Lord is an Associate Professor of Finance at Montclair State University. W. Ken Farr is a Professor of
Economics at Georgia College & State University.
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sample period is 1947 through 1980. These firm
the American steel industry and are considere
arrangement throughout this entire period. W
since there is continuing uncertainty about ho

when the US Steel Corporation's overtly collus
pricing system, collapsed. This sample provi
towards collusion before and after the breakdow
the demise of basing point pricing, subtle for
given the strong position held by US Steel. Ho
that firms operating in the industry used and
We also incorporate control variables for chan
market-to-book ratios, the volatility of equity
since previous studies suggest that these facto

Researchers also believe that many of thes
convertible securities outstanding.

Our regression results provide empirical ev

before and after the collapse of basing pointin

the sample firms altered financial leverage posi

demand and convertible security usage in th

point pricing system. There is no evidence of s

The paper proceeds as follows. Section I prese
financial leverage, price elasticity of demand,
briefly describe the American steel industry an
the method used to estimate the steel demand

Section V, we develop our model and describe th

and summarize the paper in Section VII.

I. Theoretical Development

In this section, we first illustrate the motiva

equity financing. We then demonstrate that

through the addition of nonconvertible debt.
the enforcement of collusion among the oligop

A. Collusion Among Equity Financed Fi

To demonstrate that cartel members can us
first introduce Maksimovic's (1988) equity-o
with N equal-sized firms that use only equity
where annual profits can be at one of three di
individual
actions of the participants. Let ff
d

collusion, ,ri the one-period profit of a single firm that cheats on the collusive arrangement,
and ,c"' the profit earned by firms at the non-colluding Nash equilibrium, where we assume

that Kd
> > ,iC.
We
alsoin the
assume
that
all participants
knowtoeach
of
perfect
certainty.
If the
firms
industry
can develop
a successful strategy
establish

these profit states with

and enforce
collusive
behavior, they will earn a perpetual stream of ,r and the value of
equity,
V , will
be:
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where r represents the discount rate.
If the collusive arrangement collapses, or if it cannot be established in the first place, firms

will earn a perpetual stream of zt"c. In this case, equity value, V7C , will be:

v7n = ,f (1 + ) (2)
r

Since V7 > V7C ,the incentive for collusion clearly exists. However, if firms are to establish
a cartel, they must consider the circumstances that would motivate one of the members to

cheat. If we assume that deviating from the agreement by any firm will cause the cartel to

collapse, thus leading all firms to earn ifc in subsequent periods, then the equity value for

the cheating firm, Vi , will be:
nc

V-

+(

r

(3)

Vi > V , itthe
would
benefit
anyTherefore,
cartel member
to deviate
once the
industry
andIfimplemented
collusive
strategy.
the creation,
and subsequent
continuation,

has established

of a collusive arrangement is possible only when Vi < V .

B. Nonconvertible Debt Financing
We again refer to Maksimovic (1988) to illustrate how introducing debt into a firm's capital
structure can alter the fundamental conditions that make collusion desirable. We also show

how firms can use financial leverage to help maintain a cartel by providing a publicly
observable sign of the firm's intention to abide by agreements.
We assume firms are corporations with limited liability and wish to add the greatest feasible
amount of nonconvertible debt into their capital structures. We presume that firms choose
the maximum level of debt due to tax savings associated with debt relative to equity financing
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961, and Stenbacka, 1994). We define the perpetual annual interest

obligations incurred by the ith firm as I.. When the level of debt is set so that Ii > .7
bankruptcy occurs if profits drop to ic. The threat of bankruptcy provides a powerful

incentive to maintain collusion that is mutually self-enforcing.

After the debt is issued, the value of equity for the previous three profit states becomes:

--ce
V =
r

-

I

V-7c=

--"

z"

)(1

0,

-

+-),

and

I

)"

(4)
(5)

(6)
-d -c

The addition of debt to the firms' capital str

though VW > Vi. This possibility occurs and threatens cartel stability when the annual

interest obligation of a firm rises to the point where I > ,c - r (d _ - Kf). However, the tax
nc

'The case where Ii < Zti is of little interest since collusion would be feasible under all of the same circumstances

as for all equity financing. Also, this capital structure contributes nothing to the enforcement of the cartel since
the stockholders are no longer threatened with bankruptcy.
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benefits of debt in capital structure should cr

G -ceiling,
r ( i it- provides
.1). When
a firm
promises
interest
payments
this
evidence
to other
firms thatannual
it will not
violate the
agreement. near,

but not exceeding

Further, since we can show that the profit states of ti and r are positively related to a
firm's price elasticity of demand, it follows that the debt ceiling also depends on the price
elasticity of demand. (For details on this relation, see Maksimovic, 1988.) The combination
of the threat of bankruptcy and desire to exploit the tax benefits of debt financing indicates
that colluding firms should modify their capital structures positively with fluctuations in the

price elasticity of demand. Although it is unlikely that cartel members will have all the
necessary information to set and precisely assess the threshold level of debt, it does seem

probable that the participants would know enough to establish a reasonable level of debt
and to judge if changes in leverage are justified or if they should be viewed with suspicion.
This argument leads to our first hypothesis on how firms can arrange their capital structure to

show compliance with a collusive arrangement. We design a test to search for a positive link
between leverage and price elasticity of demand. The first hypothesis is formally stated as:
Hi : Among members of a cartel, financial leverage is not positively related to a firm's
price elasticity of demand.
HI,: Among members of a cartel, financial leverage is positively related to a firm's price
elasticity of demand.
(Note that this is just one possible solution to the problem of effectively enforcing collusive

behavior. Failure to reject the null hypothesis does not imply that collusion is not taking
place, only that capital structure is not supported as the enforcement mechanism.)
Some empirical evidence already exists to suggest that firms might use capital structure
as a means to enforce collusive behavior. Chevalier (1995a,b) and Phillips (1995) conduct
event studies of local markets in which at least one of the firms increased leverage through
a leveraged buyout (LBO). They find that in markets where all firms have reasonably high
debt levels, there is a tendency for an LBO to be followed by increased prices. However,
when rivals are not highly leveraged, the LBO is often followed by a price decrease. This
decrease suggests that the other firms might be trying to exploit the LBO firm's weakness.
Our analysis differs substantially from these previous event studies that concentrate on
an isolated alteration of leverage by one firm in an industry. Using a group of firms widely
perceived to have engaged in such practices, we test for long-term evidence of the mechanism
used to enforce collusive behavior.

C. Convertible Debt Financing
Maksimovic (1988) also suggests that conversion features attached to bonds allow

colluding firms to use more leverage than the amount allowed when all debt is nonconvertible

We develop an extension of the previous model that includes only nonconvertible debt
show how this is possible.

First, we assume that each limited liability corporation issues a single class of debt securitie

that can be either convertible or nonconvertible, and that once again, the firms choose the

level of debt so that the annual interest obligations, Ii, exceed ,cr . If a firm issues convertib
bonds, we assume they all have identical conversion ratios. Next, we assume that all holders
of these convertible securities behave uniformly. This is the critical simplifying assumptio

that leads to a less ambiguous result than that of Maksimovic. He assumes the holders o
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convertible bonds will not all exercise their options at t
forces several critical assumptions about the timing of the

operating expenses that further complicate the model.

participants have perfect knowledge about the potential out
of others.

The stakeholders now follow a three-step process to determine each firm's capital
structure. First, the stockholders select the type and level of debt that establishes the

annual interest payments (Ii) and, for convertible debt, the conversion ratio that
determines the percentage of new shares of common stock created upon conversion

(2,). Forforinstance,
if 2share
= 1 and
all bondholders
oneofnew
share
created
each existing
of stock,
thus doublingconvert,
the number
shares.
The of stock will be
issuance of nonconvertible debt implies , = 0. In the second step, the stockholders of

each firm decide whether to adhere to the collusive agreement or to cheat. The last step
requires the convertible debt holders to decide whether to maintain debt ownership or
to convert to common stock. We assume that all debt holders receive their annual interest
payment prior to making the decision to convert their securities into common equity and

sharing in the distributions to the stockholders. This assumption could be altered slightly,
thus changing the exact nature of the relation, but it would not alter its substance.

To protect and preserve the established collusive agreement, the stockholders of
each firm must design the convertible debt contracts so that if cheating occurs, the
debt holders will convert and capture a substantial portion of the cheating firm's onetime profit. The possibility of conversion by debt holders is, in effect, a self-imposed
"tax" on deviating behavior that is publicly observable by other members of the cartel.
When all abide by the agreement and the debt holders do not convert, the value of firm
equity will again be = (tiR - I)(1 +-). However, ifa firm cheats and the debt holders exercise
their conversion privilege, the value of equity, V; , for the original shareholders will be:

I r J+2i
=]

[

1

(7)

When the conversion privilege is exercised, the original stockholders retain only 1/(1 + 4)

cash flows generated while the new stockholders (the former debt holders) receive the rem
incentive
in the
cartel,
requires
,/(1 + to,) remain
of the
cash
flow.
Tothat:
establish

the conditions where V > /, which preserves the

i('

1 < x ((1+ r) (l+ A i) K-r K an- c (8

i

n(8)

' 1 + [J t (1 +r)]

In Equation (8), I/ is a positive function of li since the derivative,

I li _ [z;nc i +S
r (g -t)](1+ r)
8

(

t(1

((9)

+
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d

is

positive

Ki.>

K.

>

c

under

fcC.

nc

normal

Equation

(8)

Ii > g - r fi - ti ) and still remain a compliant member of the cartel.

As a Obviously,
matter inofa world
fact,without
it is theoretically
possible
raise
Ii allwould
the attempt
way to
infinity.
perfect certainty it
is unlikelytothat
any firm

conditi

implies

th

ff if Ai is raised to

to do this, but it does show that the introduction of convertible bonds increases the maximum
level of debt financing above the ceiling that is possible with nonconvertible debt alone.
This derivation suggests that colluding firms can use more leverage in their capital structure
when convertible debt is added to the mix of debt securities outstanding. It also leads to the
second hypothesis on the capital structure decisions made by firms. A firm's leverage should

be positively correlated with the number of new shares of common stock created when
convertible securities are exercised. This second hypothesis is formally stated as:
H2o: Among members of a cartel, financial leverage is not positively related to the proportion
of new to existing shares that will be created upon conversion of all convertible securities.
H2 : Among members of a cartel, financial leverage is positively related to the proportion
of new to existing shares that will be created upon conversion of all convertible securities.

II. The American Steel Industry (1947-1980)
After the government eliminated formal price controls on steel products at the end of
World War II, steel prices remained effectively fixed under the basing point pricing system.
Under this system, US Steel published a base price for steel products in Pittsburgh and the
American Iron & Steel Institute provided a schedule of railway freight rates from Pittsburgh
to various locations throughout the country. Integrated mill steel firms would then set local

prices according to this schedule.
This overt system of collusion was maintained throughout most of the 1950s. However,
near the end of the decade, three significant events occurred that transformed the industry.

First, in 1959, the years of uneasy peace between labor and management were shattered by
a major strike. Second, new domestic electric furnace "mini mills" that recast scrap metal
began to capture the markets for round products such as wire rods, bars, pipes, and structural
shapes. Finally, extremely efficient Japanese and European rivals began to flood the market
for traditional heavy steel products.2
Mancke (1968) and Rippe (1970) found that by 1960, the basing point pricing system had
been effectively abandoned by the integrated mills. However, a Federal Trade Commission

Report by Duke, Johnson, Mueller, Quails, Rosh, and Tar (1977) argued that collusion
continued for heavy steel products even after the end of this long established pricing system.

We examine the question of how collusion continued after the collapse of the overt pricing
system by using the hypotheses developed in this paper. We reason that the existence of the
basing point pricing system and the strong price leadership position held by US Steel before
1959 rendered tacit collusion irrelevant. However, given that some sort of price setting might

have still been in place after the system's demise, the question of how such cooperation
could have been maintained remains unanswered.

The unique set of circumstances surrounding the steel industry offers the opportunity to
test Hypotheses (1) and (2) for a period when basing point pricing was in effect and also for
2For more details see, Adams (1977), Adams and Mueller (1986), Barnett and Crandall (1986), Barnett and
Schorsch (1983), Crandall (1981), Hogan (1971, 1987), and Tiffany (1988).
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a period after its collapse. We anticipate no evidence of

leverage and either price elasticity of demand, or conv

of the pricing system. However, after the system's dem
to enforce collusion, we look for significant positive r

consistent with our hypotheses.

III. Sample Firms

We collect data, from 1947 through 1980, for a samp
mill steel firms: ARMCO3, Bethlehem Steel, Universal

Republic Steel, and US Steel. We truncated the start
price data on individual steel products necessary to cal

We chose the ending date because of inconsistenci

caused by mergers among integrated mill steel firms
mostly produced large, heavy, flat steel products, rep
was sufficiently concentrated during the study years
for collusive behavior. Further, these seven firms pre
the hypothesis on convertible securities, since they us
capital structures during these years.

IV. Price Elasticity of Demand

To test the first hypothesis requires us to measure t
demand. Unfortunately, the information necessary to
individual steel mills is not available. The fact that eac
sells a number of different steel products provides an
As a proxy, we estimate the price elasticity of deman
dominated by the firms included in the sample. First,
commodity that comprises the primary products dom

throughout the sample period. These products are

sheets, galvanized sheets, and tin plates.4 We measure
of the tons of steel products shipped annually. As a pro
we use the weighted average of the prices of the steel

commodity. The weights are based on the percenta

composite. Fortunately, these weights varied little ove
scheme follows a procedure similar to that used by Ne
shipments of each steel product from various issues of
American Iron and Steel Institute and Metal Statistics.

Using the data for the Hicksian composite commodity, we model demand as:

QSTEELt = 0, + ntRSPt + 82tlPt + 3tCBONDt + 4tIERt +stTRENDt + Ltt (10)
3Known as American Rolling Mills in the early years of the study.

4See Barnett and Crandall (1986) and Hogan (1987) for a discussion of evolution of the product markets
controlled by various types of steel firms. In the later years of the study, mini mills effectively stripped away the
markets for hot rolled bars, cold finished bars, structural shapes, billots, and wire rods.
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where QSTEELt is total shipments (in tons) of s
of the products. We adjust these prices for pric
calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (19
index. CBONDr is the annual average of month

Bonds. IER, is the ratio of steel imports to expo
in 1947. Finally, jt is an additive transitory distur

We assume, a priori, that RSPt, CBONDt, and I
that IP, should have a positive influence. We i
changes in the use of steel caused by economic c

bond rate is intended to capture the impact of in

To control for the impact of foreign competitio

we include the ratio of steel imports to steel ex
capture general trends in steel usage over the y
Empirical studies typically assume that the str
over time and that any variations are transitor
assumption may not be true in many situations
period. The demand functions faced by the integr
structural changes over the years. Permanent c
have been caused by any number of factors inc
competition of foreign steel producers, the clos
Department due to its history of anticompetitive
away at the markets formerly dominated by larg
relative importance of steel products used in co
There are many ways to incorporate structural
more flexible is the Adaptive Regression Mode
1976).' The major advantage of this model is that
structures may have changed over time. This
parameters to vary through time, based on a n
inherent tendency for them to return to a mean

equation parameters are subject to stochastic v
permanent and transitory effects. The perman

parameter values through time, but the transitor
This is shown as:

y,=x: P,

t=1,2,....,T

(11)

where
y
is
a
vecto
of
explanatory
var
variation.
The
two

+, = P + v, (12)

and

Pt = P P_1 + U (13)

'For examples of the use of the adaptive regression model, see McIntosh and Shid
McIntosh (1996), and Rausser and Laumas (1976).
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where we denote the permanent component of the parameters

We assume that the stochastic variatesv, t and ut are normal, iden

distributed with mean vectors zero and covariance matrices:

cov(vt)=

(1

.y)

a2

(14)

and

cov( (vt ) = (y) 02 , (15)

where ye [0,1]. The parameter y is the rate at
meaning that asy approaches one, the effects o

the transitory ones. The matrices 1, and Z pr
variability of the parameters that are assumed
we normalize them so that the element corresp
that the first explanatory variable is the intercep
the model by the usual additive error term.
Because the process generating the parameter
likelihood function necessary for parameter est
show that a well-defined likelihood function
realizations of the parameter process at a partic
the parameter process one period (T+1) beyond
we see that:

+1
T+1

1' +1

t

T?=

+

(16)

~j=1+1

and by insertion into Equation (12) leads to:

t

T+1

B~t~~+1

j=t+l

0

(17)

Substituting It from Equation (17) for ft in Equation (11) results in:
I

Y
t

t

=x'13+i

(18)

T+1

where p3=3 , and tt tj=t+l
t t
The random disturbance vector g is normally distributed with mean vector zero and a
covariance matrix defined as:

cov(I) =02 [(1-y)R + Q] =a 2 () (19)

where R is a diagonal matrix with elements r.= x. I xi and
q.. = min{It-iI , It-jj}x i x j when bothi andj are greater th

0. We can now write the full model and the distribution of Y as:
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Y

=

X)p

+

p

(20)

where
Y
~
N[XP,o2
If
y
is
known,
we

since

all

known

at

a

the

in

other

most

particular

R
ca

fa

instanc

realiza

L(Y;

b,2,
X)
2
2y,
2
(

Maximizing

and

Equation

/)=
[ ()yX
flr)
=[XQ%)XP'X
(22)
^21

A'

'

(23)

O(y) =-[y-XP()]QU)[y-XP ] (23)

Substituting these estimators into Equation (21) y

Le

T

T
=

(Y;
2 y)
2

^2
(In 1
27c(24)
+ 1) -

-

Maximizing

log

the

likelihood

y

conce

equatio

likelihood function (say y" ) into Equations (22) and (23) to obtain estimates of P3 and d that are

asymptotically efficient (Cooley and Prescott, 1973, 1976).

Without prior knowledge that some other specification is superior, Cooley and Prescott (1973)

suggest that it is appropriate to set the relative importance of the permanent and transitory

changes equal to each other for all random parameters. This assumption suggests that v and
I are equal. Further, if we have no reason to suspect that the random parameters are correlated
with each other over time, we can assume the matrices to be diagonal. Given these assumptions,
the only requisite is the specification of the relative variability of the different parameters. Cooley

and Prescott (1976) indicate that the loss in estimation efficiency is comparatively small even for

sizeable errors in specifying the diagonal elements. In this study, we use the standard errors of
the parameters that we obtain by using a maximum likelihood estimator that assumes constant

parameters. We use these standard errors as the diagonal elements of v and X to serve as a
proxy for the relative variability of the parameters. In addition, we scale the diagonal elements so
that the first element is equal to one.

We calculate the estimated price elasticities by using each annual it, the coefficient on
real steel prices (RSP,), and the corresponding price and quantity data over the entire dataset.
We show this as:

, aRSP
= QSTEEL,
JQSTEEI, RSEt (25)
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where ~, from Equation (10) is 3(QSTEEL,) / 3(RSP,). Pa

estimates of the parameters in Equation (10), y (the permanent

standard errors of P. Panel B contains the annual estimates o

gain a visual sense of how elasticity fluctuated throughout

graphically the annual estimates of the price elasticity of de

V. The Model

We specify the following model to test the hypotheses that suggest that among cartel mem

financial leverage is positively related to both price elasticity of demand and the number

shares created if the bondholders were to exercise all outstanding convertible securities.

LEVti = oX + 1 LEVBMANt+ t2 SIGMAt,i + 13 MBti + 44 CBOND1 + iy PROFITti (26)
+ 6,PEDt + 2LAMBDAt,i + 1 SIGLAMti + 2MBLAMt,i + P3CBONDLAMt,i
+ rln, PED59 t+ r2 LAMBDA59ti + t SIGLAM59t,i + t2MBLAM59,i
+ 13 CBONDLAM59,i + iDi + ,i

We estimate the equation using panel data that includes observations from 1947
for seven domestic integrated mill steel firms. We define all the variables below and
justification for the control factors that we add to more adequately specify the mod
II contains summary statistics for the principle variables included in the model.

The dependent variable, LEVti, is the proxy for financial leverage. In calculating th

for the i'h firm in year t, the numerator is the book value of long-term debt and the deno

is the sum of the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock and the market v
common equity. We obtain the book values and number of outstanding shares from v

issues of the Moody's Industrial Manual and end-of-year stock prices from the CRSP
The first five explanatory variables represent general controls that we include in the
to capture the effects of additional factors that potentially influence the financial le

used by firms. The first, LEVBMAN, measures the average ratio of the book values o
term debt to the book values of long-term liabilities and equity for US manufacturing

the t'h year. We obtain the data from Taggart (1985) who provides information from
publication Statistics of Income. We include this term to control for systemic ch
financial leverage that are caused by fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions,

changes in tax and inflation rates, that affect all manufacturing firms in a similar fas

should be positively related to financial leverage. The second variable, SIGMAt,,

proxy for firm risk. We measure it as the annual standard deviation of monthly stock
for the i'h firm in year t using CRSP data. 6 The impact of risk on leverage is difficult to

a priori. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the risk of equity should increase

financial leverage rises. However, other researchers argue that debt can be ne
correlated with operational risk. Either relation can hold since our sample contai
series and cross-sectional elements. The empirical evidence on the relation betwe

measured by the volatility of either earnings or stock returns, and financial leverag
6We also tried beta from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as an estimate of systematic risk, but
were not statistically significant.
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Table I. Demand Equation Parameter
In panel A, we show the parameter estimates obtained

elasticity of demand estimates ( ) obtained using Equ

QSTEEL = P, + itRSP, + 2tIP+ P3tCBOND, + f4,

SQSTEEL, RSP

aRSP, QSTEEL,

We define the variables of Equation (10) as follows. QSTEEL, is the proxy for output of the sample
integrated mill steel firms. We specify QSTEEL, as a Hicksian composite commodity composed of the

total shipments of steel products (measured in tons) that consist of plates, hot rolled sheets, cold rolled
sheets, galvanized sheets, and tin plates. RSP, is the weighted real price of the steel products included in
the composite commodity. IP, is the annual industrial production index. CBOND, is the annual average of
monthly yields on Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bonds. IER, is the ratio of U.S. steel imports to U.S.
exports. TREND, is a time variable starting at one in 1947. We use data from 1947-1985 to estimate the
demand function. The results shown in both panels are truncated in 1980 to be consistent with other data
available for the integrated mill steel firms. Gamma represents the rate that the W's adapt to structural

change in the adaptive regression model. Maximum likelihood estimation is used given 0 < ,< 1 in

increments of 0.02. When gamma equals one, the variance-covariance matrix is si/pgularwhich prevents
parameter estimation. Parameter estimates and standard errors are unchanged when 7, = 0. This happened
in 1947-58, 1970-72, and 1974-80, hence only the estimates for 1947 are shown to save space. Asymptotic
standard errors are reported in parentheses. We calculate the price elasticity of demand estimates (4) using

Equation (25) where aQSTEEL, / RSP, is P,, from Equation (10) and RSP, and QSTEEL, are the actual

annual observations of these two variables in the t'h year.

Panel A. Equation (10) Parameter Estimates
Gamma

Interceptt RSPR IPt CBONDt IERe TRENDt

Year '() (8or) (81t) (821) (83t) (84t) (8st)

1947 0.00 46,963.93 -95.06 520.00 -3,781.21 -862.67 718.86

(11,251)*** (33.97)*** (120.7)*** (375.9)*** (243.8)*** (312.3)**

1959 0.12 48,482.23 -112.45 682.10 -3,106.23 -780.63 286.09

(13,266)*** (39.96)*** (124.8)*** (475.0)*** (260.7)*** (334.3)
1960 0.22 44,014.20 -101.74 761.35 -2,770.16 -779.16 -5.11

(13,073)*** (39.13)** (127.8)*** (519.0)*** (254.2)*** (355.0)

1961 0.10 43,396.78 -95.39 701.96 -3,028.46 -875.77 153.38

(12,126)*** (36.24)** (127.1)*** (469.9)*** (240.6)*** (350.6)
1962 0.10 39,334.08 -81.01 716.53 -3,004.70 -916.60 68.93

(11,460)*** (33.93)** (127.6)*** (475.9)*** (235.9)*** (361.2)

1963 0.08 39,271.42 -77.79 706.76 -2,996.53 -909.05 52.85

(11,104)*** (32.76)** (127.4)*** (477.5)*** (236.7)*** (368.6)
1964 0.12 37,939.28 -70.48 707.31 -2,707.69 -858.43 -69.09
(10,761)*** (31.57)** (126.7)*** (508.2)*** (241.3)*** (381.6)
1965 0.12 33,846.39 -56.11 727.34 -2,712.15 -847.84 -171.03

(10,933)*** (32.34)* (128.2)*** (514.9)*** (245.9)*** (395.4)
1966 0.20 29,344.07 -44.07 783.77 -2,484.58 -807.11 -440.76
(11,205)** (33.48) (132.1)*** (531.2)*** (255.8)*** (424.4)
1967 0.16 34,115.11 -56.86 720.92 -2,554.01 -700.02 -300.91
(12,129)*** (37.15) (136.0)*** (532.2)*** (275.9)*** (448.5)
1968 0.30 41,134.52 -77.12 719.34 -2,339.77 -440.87 -449.64
(12,665)*** (39.85)* (136.8)*** (543.5)*** (283.5) (483.6)
1969 0.64 38,253.84 -66.74 830.65 -1,766.74 -323.97 -1,063.27
(10,829)*** (34.14)* (114.8)*** (528.9)*** (225.9) (457.2)**
1973 0.72 55,760.95 -123.02 874.63 -3,028.15 -624.07 -655.77
(9,650)*** (36.86)*** (119.4)*** (409.4)*** (161.5)*** (437.3)
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Table I. Demand Equation Parameter and Elasticity
Panel B. Price Elasticity ofDemand Estimates

Year Elasticity (et) Year Elasticity (et) Year Elastici
1947 1.028 1956 0.730 1965 0.370 1974 0.477
1948 0.921 1957 0.791 1966 0.298 1975 0.738
1949 1.132 1958 1.044 1967 0.414 1976 0.611

1950
1951
1952
1953

0.911
0.810
1.001
0.826

1959
1960
1961
1962

1.028
0.866
0.893
0.708

1968
1969
1970
1971

0.499
0.419
0.632
0.656

1977
1978
1979
1980

0.645
0.625
0.592
0.731

1954 1.047 1963 0.650 1972 0.646

1955 0.718 1964 0.521 1973 0.629

***Significant at the 0.01 level.
**Significant at the 0.05 level.
*Significant at the 0.10 level.

Figure I. Leverage and Price Elasticity of Demand
Yearly movements of the proxy for price elasticity of demand and average leverage for the sample
integrated mill steel firms.

1.2

o.8-

0.6

"

0.4
0.2

1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980

, - - Price Elasticity of Demand Average Leverage I
been mixed and provides little guidance.7 Hence we have noa prioriexpectation concerning
the impact of risk on leverage.
Our third control variable, MBti, measures the market-to-book ratio for theith firm in yeart.
We take the data necessary to compute this ratio from various issues of the Moody 's Industrial
Manual and the CRSP tape. This ratio is the proxy for the extent to which firm value is based

on options on future opportunities rather than assets in place. Since it is difficult for
bondholders receiving fixed payments to rely on such options, many studies (e.g., Titman
7Carleton and Silberman (1977), Castanias (1983), and Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) all find a negative
relation. Toy, Stonehill, Remmers, and Beekhuisen (1974), Long and Malitz (1985) and Kim and Sorensen
(1986) find positive relations. Ferri and Jones (1979), Flath and Knoeber (1980) and Titman and Wessels (1988)
find no significant relations. Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) find evidence of a non-linear relation among these
variables. Note that in most of the studies, the direction of the relation tends to vary by industry.
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Table II. Summary Statistics of the

This table shows the means and standard deviation
We define the variables shown below as follows.
the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to
preferred stock and the market value of common

of all US manufacturing firms. SIGMA is the st

returns. MB is the market-to-book ratio of equity
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bonds. PROFIT is t
gross profits (sales minus cost-of-goods-sold) to sa
demand for the integrated mill steel firms. LAMBD
current shares outstanding.
Variable Mean Standard Dev.

1947-1980: (Observations: 238) LEV 0.267 0.158

LEVBMAN 0.200 0.058

SIGMA
MB

0.069

0.804

0.022

0.378

CBOND

5.454

2.469

PROFIT

0.149

0.064

PED

0.724

0.211

LAMBDA 0.031 0.064

1947-1958: (Observations: 84) LEV 0.148 0.114
LEVBMAN 0.141 0.021

SIGMA
MB

0.066

0.937

0.019

0.396

CBOND

3.061

PROFIT

0.181

PED

0.913

LAMBDA

0.413
0.050

0.132

0.028

0.063

1959-1980: (Observations: 154) LEV 0.332 0.141
LEVBMAN 0.232 0.044

SIGMA
MB

0.070

0.732

CBOND

6.759

PROFIT

0.131

PED

0.620

LAMBDA

and

Wessels,

0.024

0.349

1988)

2.118

0.032

document

0.064

0.170
0.064

a

significan

the market-to-book ratio.

The fourth variable, CBONDt, is the annual average of monthly yields on Moody's Seasoned

Aaa Corporate Bonds. Because the control variable LEVBMAN, is a financial leverage
measure based on the book value of equity, it might not fully control for the effects of
changing market interest rates since LEVt,i is calculated using the market value of equity. To
account for this possibility we include CBOND, as a proxy for market interest rates in the

model. The effect of this variable on a market-based measure of financial leverage is also
difficult to predict. On the one hand, an increase in rates might decrease the value of equity,

thus increasing
LEVt.from
On long-term
the otherdebt
hand,
manyinstudies
suggest
that when
rates
firms
tend to shy away
financing
favor of
raising marginal
capital
in are high,
the form of equity.
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The last
general
control
variable
is, PROFITti,
a proxy for
firm relation
profitability.
because
Titman
and Wessels
(1988)
show that
there is a significant
negative
between We include it
leverage and profitability. We measure this variable as the ratio of gross profits (sales minus

cost-of-goods-sold) to sales revenue of the i'h firm in the t'h year. Again, we collect the
necessary data from Moody's Industrial Manuals.

The next two explanatory variables, PEDt and LAMBDAt,i, test the two hypotheses
developed in this paper. The first, PED, measures the price elasticity of demand of the
industry sector dominated by the integrated steel mills in the t'h year. Panel B of Table I,
shown in the previous section, contains the annual price elasticity estimates. We hypothesize
that price elasticity of demand should be positively related to financial leverage.

The second variable, LAMBDAti, measures the number of new shares created if all
outstanding convertible securities of the i'h firm are exercised at time t. The securities we use

in the estimation of LAMBDAt,i (t,i) are convertible bonds and preferred stocks. We do not
include warrants outstanding, since Maksimovic (1988) argues that their effect on collusive
behavior is subtly different relative to convertible bonds and preferred stocks. However,
inclusion of the rare warrant issues in t,~i had no appreciable impact on any of the regression
results.8 We obtain the number of outstanding shares and convertibility options from the

Moody's Industrial Manuals. We hypothesize that the number of convertibility options is
positively related to financial leverage.

The next three variables, SIGLAMt,i, MBLAM t,, and CBONDLAMti, are cross-product

terms that we use to control for the fact that the decision to issue convertible securities can

also be influenced by several exogenous factors. To date, there have been several theoretical
propositions advanced for the issuance of convertibles. Two traditionally popular rationale

for the issue of these securities are that they serve as a "sweetener" to lower borrowing
costs, particularly when rates are high, and that they can serve as delayed equity financing
when stock value is low (Billingsley and Smith, 1996.) Two more recent theoretical arguments

focus on how convertibles can reduce agency costs of debt financing by diminishing
stockholders incentives to invest in overly risky projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Brennan and Schwartz, 1977; Green, 1984; Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1985; and Mayers,
1998), and how they can help relay to markets positive, asymmetrical information possessed
by managers (Stein, 1992). These arguments ultimately center on four factors that might
induce firms to issue convertible securities. They are high interest rates, undervalued firm
equity, volatility of firm returns, and the presence of asymmetrical information possessed by
the manager concerning future firm performance. These factors must be controlled for in the
model in order to examine if convertible securities allow firms to use more debt in their capital

structure than would be allowed within the collusive arrangement with straight debt alone.
The control variables SIGMAti and CBONDti provide readily available proxies for firm risk

and the level of interest rates, respectively. In addition, previous studies have used the

market-to-book
ratio, MBt,, information.
as a proxy for
both under-valuation
of equity
and the
of
high levels of asymmetrical
Therefore,
we incorporate the
interaction
of existence
these factors with the levels of convertible debt outstanding by introducing the cross-

product terms SIGLAMti, MBLAMti, and CBONDLAMti, which are the products of
LAMBDAt,i with SIGMAtI, MBti, and CBONDt, respectively. The coefficients on these

variables describe the impact of the interaction of these factors on financial leverage. We

8Theparameters.
inclusion of
LAMBDAi
in because
Equation
26decision
also introduces
the debt
potential
simultaneity
bias when we estimate
the
This
bias arises
the
to issue new
with for
options
attached simultaneously
affects the dependent variable LEVt and the independent variable LAMBDAt . However, since the overwhelming
majority of debt in this sample is nonconvertible, we believe that the bias is inconsequential.

This content downloaded from
130.68.155.83 on Wed, 01 Jun 2022 15:41:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

142 Financial Management* Spring2003

have no a priori expectation on how these in
We contend that the existence of the overt
subtle covert collusion unnecessary. Thus, i
differs markedly before and after 1959 in rela
include the next five independent variables to
variable that is set to zero before 1959 and one thereafter. We then create interaction terms as

the products of this dummy variable with PED,, LAMBDA ,, SIGLAM,i, MBLAMt,i, and
CBONDLAM,i These are shown in the model as PED59t, LAMBDA59, , SIGLAM59, ,
MBLAM59, , and CBONDLAM59, . Including these terms in the model defines the parameters

06 and , as the marginal impact of the associated variables on leverage before 1959, and the
mi and c parameter estimates show changes to i and 4~ in the years following 1958.
Given that we estimate Equation 26 using panel data, firm dummy variables (D) are added
to the model to capture any firm specific information that affects base level differences in
capital structure across firms. We examine the structure of the error terms and find they are
first-order autoregressive with contemporaneous correlation between the cross-sections.
This error structure is represented as:

and

,Lt.i = P ri, i + Ei,t (27)
E[ 't,i, 'i ] = o j (28)

We use the Parks (1967) method to estimate the param
particular error structure.

VI. Results

Table III shows our parameter estimates for Equation 26. All five of the general con
variables are statistically significant. Those for which we developed a priori expectati

behave as anticipated. The coefficient on LEVBMANt ('l) is not only positive and signific
but an F-test indicates that the estimate is not significantly different from one. This r
suggests that the integrated mill steel firms alter their financial leverage in a manner simi
to other manufacturing firms in response to changes in overall macroeconomic conditio
Consistent with earlier empirical results, such as Titman and Wessels (1988), the varia

MBti, andwith
PROFITt,i,
(parameters
i3 and
are negative
and
correlated
leverage. Parameter
estimates
for9,,
therespectively)
two control variables
for which
we significantly
had
no a priori expectation are also statistically significant. The parameter estimate \2 on SIGMA
indicates that risk is negatively correlated with leverage. The parameter estimate (14) on
CBOND, indicates a significant positive impact of market interest rates on leverage decisions
among these firms.

The parameters 0, 2, rll, andrl2 represent the coefficients on the variables that we use to

test our hypotheses. 0, and 02 measure the impact of the price elasticity of demand (PED,)
and the portion of new shares created if bondholders were to exercise all convertibility

options (LAMBDAt,i), respectively, on leverage before 1959. Neither parameter is statistically
significant. This evidence supports our expectation that the overtly collusive basing point
pricing system rendered subtle enforcement mechanisms, such as those we describe in this
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Table III. Empirical Regression Results

This table shows the parameter and standard error estimat

Equation (26).

LEVti = + Ws LEVBMANt + '2 SIGMAti + 3 MB . + U4 CBONDt + V PROFITi + 0 PEDt

+ 2 LAMBDAtii + SIGLAMti + (2 MBLA t~i + (3 CBONDLAMti - rl PfID59t
+ r, LAMBDA59t + -, SIGLAMI59, + t2 MBLAM59, + 3, CBONLLAM59,,i + XiDi + i

We define the variables as follows. LEVti is the proxy for financial leverage measured as the ratio of the
book value of long-term debt to the sum of the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock and the

market value of common equity. LEVBMAN is the average financial leverage of all US manufacturing
firms. SIGMA is the standard deviation of annual average monthly stock returns. MB is the market-tobook ratio of equity. CBOND is the annual average of monthly yields on Moody's SeasonedAaa Corporate
Bonds. PROFIT is the proxy for firm profits measured as the ratio of gross profits (sales minus cost-ofgoods-sold) to sales revenue. PED is the proxy for price elasticity of demand for integrated mill steel firms.
LAMBDA is the ratio of convertible security options against current shares outstanding. SIGLAM is an
interaction term that is the product of SIGMA and LAMBDA. MBLAM is an interaction term that is the
product of MB and LAMBDA. CBONDLAM is an interaction term that is the product of CBOND and
LAMBDA. PED59 and LAMBDA59 are interaction terms of PED and LAMBDA with a dummy variable

set to one in the years after 1958. SIGLAM59, MBLAM59, and CBONDLAM59 are interaction terms
with the variables SIGLAM, MBLAM, and CBONDLAM with a dummy variable set to one in the years
after 1958. We include dummy variables to capture base level differences in capital structure across firms.
To conserve space, we do not show these cross-sectional intercept-shifting parameter estimates, but they
are available from the authors on request. An F-test confirms the joint hypothesis of significant differences
in base level capital structures across the sample firms. An F-test confirms that the parameter estimate of
LEVBMAN is not significantly different from one. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Parameter

W1

Variable

Parameter

LEVBMAN

W2
43

14

0

Estimates

.978

(0.238)**
-0.390

SIGMA

(0.131)***

MB

-0.141
(0.01
CBOND
0.016
(0.006)***

45

PROFIT

01

PED

-0.218

(0.077)***

0.014

(0.020)

02

LAMBDA

-1.192

(P

SIGLAM

2.092

P2

(3

MBLAM

(1.262)

(4.212)
-0.331
(0.229)

CBONDLAM

m1
12

(0.367)

0.052

(0.014)*

LAMBDA59

ti
t2

PED59

0.639

SIGLAM59

MBLAM59

3.811

(1.405)***

-0.854

(4.381)

-2.113

(0.451)***

:3 CBONDLAM59 -0.809
(0.375)**
***Significant at the 0.01 level. R2 = 0.780

**Significant at the 0.05 level. N = 238
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study unnecessary. However, the positive and signific

two fundamental hypotheses. These parameters measu
after the collapse of the basing point pricing system.

The positive and significant sign on rl, supports the
firms altered financial leverage positively in response t
This result indicates that changes in product market c

financial leverage. This outcome also supports our con

among these firms, at least to some extent, through
capital structure choices. Figure I shows the yearly joi
these firms with price elasticity of demand. This grap
of a meaningful correlation before 1959 and a relative
period, particularly after 1965.

We estimate the economic significance of the impact o

financial leverage by using average values of the relev

elasticity demand in the period after 1958 was 0.62 with

The empirical estimate of the partial derivative of leve

which is the sum of 01 and rl, is 0.066. This result sugg
increases from its mean by one standard deviation, the

sample mean of 33.20% to 34.32% (0.066 x 0.17). If we as

unchanged, this increase implies a 5.14% rise in the tot

$461.47 million, an increase of about $22.54 million for th

The parameter r2 is also positive and significant. Thi
convertibles into the mix of debt securities, a firm is

would normally be permissible within the collusive ar
cartel's stability.

Figure II shows the relations between the average

average number of convertibility options outstanding

results, the visual evidence supports the significa

convertibility options outstanding and leverage af

particularly following 1965. Before 1959, the use of co
result in significantly higher usage of debt, suggestin

convertible obligations. However, in later years, th

convertible securities to raise needed marginal capital
collusive arrangement if it had been issued as non-con
The interaction terms in Equation (26) included to co
factors on the issuance of convertible securities also show contrast before and after the

collapse of the basing point pricing system. Before 1959, none of the parameter estimates

,2' and Q3) on the cross-product terms SIGLAM , MBLAM , and CBONDLAM , nor

coefficient on LAMBDA (02), are statistically significant. These results suggest that befor
1959, the firms that issued convertibles did so for some reason other than to increase overa

leverage. On the other hand, two of the three parameters on the cross-product terms, z2

MBLAM59t.
and I3 on
CBONDLAM59
, are statistically
significant.
These
that
after 1959 financial
leverage
was also significantly
influenced by the
interactions of
the

findings indicate

decision to issue convertible securities with the market-to-book ratios and interest rates.

9Since the impact on leverage of product market changes and convertibles could conceivably be delayed, we substitut
one-period lags of price elasticity of demand and convertible security options outstanding into Equation (26) to te
for this possibility. The estimated results show that neither of the lagged variables is statistically significant.
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Figure II. Leverage and Convertible Secur

Yearly movements of the average number of convertibility optio
average leverage for the sample integrated mill steel firms.
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VII. Summary and Conclusion

We test propositions that firms can arrange their capital structure in such a wa

publicly demonstrate compliance with a collusive agreement. We show that when a gro
firms employ financial leverage as the mechanism to enforce collusion, there is a ceili
the amount of nonconvertible debt that each firm can issue. Further, we show that u

these conditions this debt ceiling varies positively with changes in price elasticity of de
We also demonstrate that it is possible for an individual firm to increase its debt leve

the ceiling by issuing convertible bonds.
We use data from seven American integrated steel mill firms to test these propositi
This sector of the steel industry was highly concentrated during our study, thus prov
conditions necessary for collusion to exist.
We collect time-series data on financial leverage and convertible securities for the se

firms during the period from 1947 to 1980. We use an adaptive regression techn

calculate the corresponding price elasticities of demand for the steel products dominat
these firms. To control for other general factors that have been shown to influence l
decisions, we include variables for the average leverage for domestic manufacturing f
firm risk, the market-to-book ratio, market interest rate conditions, and firm profitabi

include cross-product variables to capture how convertible options outstanding i

with the other factors that might affect the decision to issue convertibles (risk, the ma
to-book ratio, and market interest rates).

We find that substantive changes occurred in the integrated steel industry followin

collapse of the overtly collusive basing point pricing system around 1959. Before

subtle forms of tacit collusion were most likely unnecessary. However, after 1958 the si

is very different. Since these firms still may have engaged in some form of price settin

are still questions about how they were able to maintain collusive pricing without

price leadership. Because of the structural differences before and after the collapse of
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point pricing system, we design our model to isolate
firms under the two different regimes.

The regression results support our hypothesis that th
altered leverage in response to changes in the price e

1958. Further, empirical evidence shows that during t
increased their use of leverage when they included con

obligations. As we expected, we found no evidence

either price elasticity of demand or the number of c
the collapse of the basing point pricing system.
The results of our study indicate that it is possible for

through the design of their capital structure. Indeed, t

into how the firms in the integrated mill sector of the Am

oligopolistic collusion after the collapse of basing poi
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